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shall be recorded before the entry of the judgment under which such subsequent
judgment creditor claims. Thus, since the time of the vesting of the title relates
back to the time when the grantor handed the deed over to the depositary, the
unrecorded deed, in point of time, comes before all judgment creditors after that
date. But if the judgment is duly entered, the Act of 1931 protects the judgment
creditor. Of course, if the judgment creditor has actual notice, or if the deed is
recorded, he is not protected. Upon the death of the grantor all his debts become
a lien upon his property for one year. But, since the Act of 1931 specifies judgment creditors and omits any mention of these lien creditors,'3 creditors who got
their lien because of the death of the grantor probably will not be protected over
such a prior unrecorded deed.
HAROLD F. KERCHNER

MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE IN THE PERPETRATION OF
FELONIES: DEFINITION OF THE FELONIES
An interesting question in the Pennsylvania law of homicide involves the
precise definitions of the five enumerated felonies a murder in the perpetration of
which becomes murder in the first degree. The Criminal Ccae of 1860 provides
that:
"All murder which shall be. . .committed in the perpetration of,
or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary,
shall be deemed murder of the first degree. .. I
An amendment, enacted in 1923,2 makes minor changes in the wording and adds
kidnapping to the list of felonies.
The question may be illustrated by a hypothetical case: a man commits murder
in the course of burning down the house he occupies but does not own. Has he
murdered in the commission of "arson"? His burning of the house which he
occupied was not arson at common law,3 nor by the Code of 1860,4 but became
arson by statute in 1881.5 It was arson at the time of the commission of the crime.
4SAct of 1901 said "judgment or other lien creditors."

'Act

of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382, §74.
2Act bf May 22, 1923, P. L. 306, §1.
8C. J, 553; Rex v. Holmes, Cro. Car. 376, 79 Eng. Rep. 928; Rex v. Schofield, East P. C.
1028; Rex v. Breeme, East P. C. 1026; and see C. v. Gentzler, 15 Pa. Dist. 934; C. v. Bruno, 316

Pa. 394.
4
See discussion of this point in C. v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, at 400, 175 A. 518, at 520-21, and
authorities cited. Although no Pennsylvania case so holds directly, there is little doubt that this is
the law, as is set forth in the dicta in the Bruno case, based on the general rule as to statutory

reile.ratiop of substantially the same definitions of crimes as obtained at the common law, and upon
authorities from other states having similar statutory provisions.
5Act of June 10, 1881, P. L. 117; C. v. Levine, 82 Pa. Super. 105.
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No case gives the specific answer, which can therefore be determined only
by noting the decisions in analogous cases and by organizing the material into a
logical trend. In the abstract, the question might be answered in these different
ways:
I. The courts might define each of the felonies separately, without
reference to any rule of definition. This appears unlikely, in view
of the widely accepted use of reasoning by analogy by the courts,
which would lead them to accept the same rule of definition for one
felony as had been announced for another.
II. The courts might lay down a general rule of definition, as, for
example, the definition most favorable to the defendant, or the
narrowest definition of the felony. There is language in some of
the cases which would support this interpretation, 6 but this method
is advanced largely by way of additional justification for a holding
under the third theory, the logic of which is considered to be superior.
Ill. The courts might set forth a rule depending on chronology.
Under this theory the following possibilities present themselves:
1. The definition at common law;
2.

The definition provided by the Code of 1860;

3. The definition prevailing in 1923, the time of the amendment and re-enactment;
4.

The definition prevailing at the time of commission of
the crime.

The fourth possibility is quickly eliminated. Under such a rule the definition
of first degree murder by the statute of 1860 would be subject to unlimited change,
without specific amendment, by the mere fact of subsequent enlargement of any
of the enumerated felonies. This would be contrary to the rule that a criminal
statute cannot be enlarged by implication. 7 The leading case of Commonwealth
v. Elder, 243 Pa. 155, specifically eliminates this possibility. In that case, the
S"It is not the construction that is supported by the greater reason that is to prevail, but the
one which, if reasonable, operates in favor of life and liberty." C. v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155 at page
162. ". . . strict construction is imperatively required . . .," Ad. at page 164. "No person is to
be made subject to a penal statute by implication, all doubts concerning their interpretation are to
preponderate in favor of the accused." Id. at page 163, quoting Bishop's Criminal Law. See also,
similar language in C. v. Ruttenberg, 19 D. & C. 534; C. v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309.
7?Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, §332; 59 C. J. 1115; C. v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155; C. v.
Baker, 115 Pa. Super. 183, 175 A. 438; Bucher v. C., 103 Pa. 528, 534; C. v. Sevey, 26 D. & C. 600;
Johnson v. S., (Ga., 1907) 58 S. E. 265. Note that this principle does not apply to second degree
murder. S. v. Smith, 32 Me. 369; P. v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 159. See post, note 16.
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evidence indicated that the defendant had had sexual intercourse with a girl
under sixteen years of age, causing injuries and shock of which she died. No
evidence showing lack of consent on the part of the girl was produced. The
defendant, therefore, could not have been convicted of rape under the common
law,8 nor under the statute of 1860. 9 The evidence did, however, make out a
case of "statutory rape," under the Act of 1887.10 The court held that a killing
in the perpetration of statutory rape was not murder in the first degree, because
to so hold would be to extend (by implication and without express amendment)
the penalty of the 74th section of the Code of 1860 defining murder in the first
degree to an offense created and defined by a subsequent statute. This decision
was in accord with a general rule for the construction of penal statutes, which is
supported by strong authority.1 1
The rule of the Exler case was followed in the case of Commonwealth v.
Rtttenberg, 19 D. & C. 534.

In this case, defendant was convicted of second

degree murder. He had burned his own building, a store and dwelling, in the
course of which one Zimmerman received fatal burns. The question was different
from, but analogous to, the one at hand. It involved the necessity for proving
that the death resulted during the commission of a felony, since a killing during
commission of any felony is murder.12 The burning of his own building, the
court said, was not a felony at common law18 nor by the code of 186014 but
became arson and a felony by the Act of April 25, 1929.15

651.

The court held that

81 East P. C. 434; 4 B!. Com. 210; see C. v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309.
9C. v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309; see also C. v. Childs, 2 Pitts. 391; C. v, Duchnicz, 42 C. C.

lOAct of May 19, 1887, P. L. 128.
l1See authorities cited supra, note 7; and Bishop, Criminal Law, §225.
12The Pennsylvania statutes do not define murder but merely separate it into degrees. Therefore, the'definition of murder in Pennsylvania remains the same as the definition at common law.
See Hitchler, "The New Definition of Murder in the First Degree," 29 Dickinson L. R. 63. A
kill;ng during the commission of any felony was murder at common law, 29 C. J. 1097; S. v. Leiper,
70 Ia. 748, 30 N. W. 501; P. v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 159; and remains so under the murder
Statute. See C. v. Robb, 284 Pa. 99, and Hitchler, supra, at page 73.
1It is. to be questioned whether. or not the court was correct here in stating that "prior to the
Act of 1929, a defendant who burned his own dwelling house could not be convicted of arson."
and that ihe Act of 1929 broadened the scope of arson "to include the burning of any dwelling
*ihether the property of himself or another," since common law arson was not an offense against
ownership, but against occupancy, (C. v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394) and an owner might be guilty of
arson if he burned a building which was occupied by another although owned by himself.
Wharton Criminal Law, 8th ed., §837. It does not appear in the reported opinion whether or
not the defendant occupied his building or merely owned it while it was occupied by another. Had
the defendant not been occupying the building, it is submitted that his burning of the building
would 4 have been arson at common law.
1 Section 137 of the Act of 1860 enlarges common law arson to certain additional classes of
structures burnt, but does not otherwise change the elements of the crime. The statute contains
the words "of another." See discussion in C. v. Levine, 82 Pa. Super. 105.
15P. L. 767. If, as discussed in note 13, the defendant had been the occupant of the building
it would appear that reference to the 1929 statute would be superfluous, and the Act of 1881, P. L.
1.17, abolishing the defense of occupancy, would control. The Act of 1929 does not refer to
occupancy, but merely uses words of ownership: "whether the property of himself or of another,'
which words would appear to leave unchanged, but for the prior statute of 1881, the common law
in regard to occupancy.
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the 1929 statute merely created a new offense, burning one's own building, which
had no amendatory effect upon the murder statute of 1860.16
Said the court:
"When an offense is created by statute and the same statute provides
a penalty or mode of punishment, only that which the statute provides can be followed. While remedial laws may extend to new
things not in esse at the time of the making of the statute, penal
laws will not, nor will they extend to an offense created and defined
by subsequent statutes."
In other words, the mere fact that the Legislature chose to name its new crime
'arson" had no effect on other existing statutes based upon the burning of the
building of another, long known as "arson." The Legislature might have cleared
up 2ll doubt by calling the new crime "burning of one's own house," but the fact
that it preferred "arson" made no difference in its effect. So far as the laws of

1860 or 1923 are concerned, it is not arson.
The third possible definition, which at first sight appears to be the most
logical, can also be disposed of easily. Language later used by the Court in

supFort of the reasoning of the Exler case based the result upon the fact that the
"leg ;slature did not have and could not have had 'statutory rape' in mind when
it determined the penalty" for first degree murder in the commission of rape.',
The Legislature most certainly must have had statutory rape in mind as rape when
it re'enacted the murder statute in the course of amendment in 1923. Statutory
rape was at that time a thing "in esse," and was obviously known by the Legislature to be included in the term "rape." There are no cases, however, which
support this view, and the general rule of construction is that "words used in the
original act will be presumed to be used in the same sense in the amendment," 18
1i!But did the court need to look to the 1860 statute at all, except forpunishment? The offense
of second degree murder is not defined in any sense by statute, but is merely all of common law
murder which is not included under the statutory delireation of murder in the first degree. See
Hitchlhr, "The New Definition of Murder in the First Degree," 29 Dickinson L. R. 63. If this
is so, it should follow that second degree murder may be enlarged by enlargements in the common
law. The common law definitions of felonies may be enlarged by statute (C. v. Levine, 82 Pa.
Super. 105). Why, then, is not the common law definition of murder enlarged by statutory enlargement of the common law definitions of felonies in the course of which it is committed? 1:
was so held in S. v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578, the court holding that the common law
rule that an unintended killing is murder or manslaughtei depending on whether committed during
a felorty or a misdemeanor had "reference to such graduation of crimes as might from time to
time obtain" and was not "to perpetuate the ancient classification of offenses." The reason that
first degree murder is not enlarged by subsequent enlargement of the collateral felonies lies in
rules of construction of penal statutes-the Act of 1860. But the elements of second degree murder
are not defined by statute, and it is difficult to see how rules of law governing construction of such
statutes can apply to a definition purely common law in character. See also C. v. Pemberton, 11
Mass. 36; P. v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 159, 174, where the court says, "'as often as the legis.
lature creates new felonies, a new class of murders is created."
17C. v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, 401.
1859 C. J. 1095; Thorn v. Brown, 257 Fed. 519, 523; Johnson v. S., (Ga., 1907) 58 S, E. 265.
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for it is presumed that the Legislature in adopting the amendment had in mind the
judicial construction of the original statute. 19 "Where an amendment leaves
certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions of the existing law
as are retained are regarded as continuation of existing law and not a new enactment." 0 Thus, it seems that the fact that the Legislature knew that the crimes
of rape and arson had been enlarged since the original enactment of the statute
of 1860 would be immaterial, for the judicial construction placed upon the term
"rape" in the murder statute (as construed by the Exler case) would continue to
apply, even after a re-enactment of the murder statute in the course of amend2
ment. 1
In the light of all the foregoing, it must be taken that the terms rape, robbery, arson, and burglary, as used in the first degree murder statute, may not be
defined as of the date of the commission of the crime, nor as of the date of the
amending statute, but may possibly be defined in either of two ways: (1) according to the definitions ptevailing at common law, or (2) according to those set
forth in the Criminal Code of 1860. There are dicta which indicate a feeling on
the part of our Supreme Court that the definitions at common law are to be used,
but the actual holdings in no wise indicate such a conclusion, and it would seem
that perhaps better reasoning supports the view that the definitions of the felonies
as laid down in 1860 should prevail.
In the Exler case, the Court said that the term rape as used in the murder
statute meant common law rape,22 but since rape at common law and rape by the
1860 Code are substantially the same crime,28 and since the term "common law
rape" is frequently used colloquially to differentiate the older non-consensual
crime from the newver "statutory rape," this use of the term is not convincing.
There isi
indeed, a well recognized rule that where a word which had a definite
meaning at common law is used in a statute, the word is taken to be used in its
common law sense, unless a contrary intention on the part of the Legislature is
indicated. 24 But this rule would not apply here, for inclusion of statutory definitions of these felonies in the same Code which used them to define first degree
,murder would seem to express very definitely the required contrary intention on
the part of the Legislature.
1959 C. J. 1096.
1d,j 1097.
21Thorn v. Brown, 257 Fed. 519.
.2 t.page 159.
2SCompare. the wording of the statute with the language of IV BI. Com. 210-211, and see
excellent discussion of the important elements in the Exler opinion and in C. v. Miller, 80 Pa.
Super, 309.
24. When a legislative body selects and uses in a statute words or clauses which before the
enactment of the law had acquired by judicial interpretation or common consent and use a wellunderstood meaning and legal effect, the legal presumption is that it intended that they should have
that meaning and effect in the statute it enacts." Thorn v. Brown, 257 Fed. 519, at 523.
20

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Furthermore, the reasoning used would equally support the argument that
the definitions used in the Code of 1860 are to control. This is true of the Exler
25
opinion wherein the court said that the definitions at common law were meant.

Surely, if the court is to base its decision on the fact that a penal statute will not
be construed to extend by implication to that which was not in the mind of the
Legislature at the time of passage, it cannot ignore the fact that the Legislature in
the case of our present problem had most immediately under consideration at the
time of enactment of the 1860 Code the statutory definitions contained in that
same Code. It is to defy common sense to maintain that a legislative body will\in
one part of an act define certain terms, then, using the same terms in another part
of the same act, intend that their meaning shall be otherwise. Yet this is the
conclusion we cannot escape if we say that the definitions of arson, robbery, rape
and burglary as used in Section 74 of the Code are not the arson, robbery, rape
and burglary as defined in other sections of the same Code.
Examining the cases, we find that the court in Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316
Pa. 394, stated that "there can be no doubt whatever that 'arson' as used in the
murder section of the Act of 1860 was intended to include (italics supplied)
common law arson, in view of the fact that section 137 of that act embraced in
its definition of arson the malicious burning of 'any dwelling house of another'."
The court did not say that the term "arson," as used in the murder section, meant
common law arson, but merely that it included it. And in noting that the arson
as defined elsewhere in the act "embraced" common law arson, the court did
nothing to clarify the point. At least the court appears to give weight to the
definitions of the felonies contained in the other sections of the 1860 Code.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Robb, 284 Pa. 99, where the conviction was
merely for murder in the second degree, the case, therefore; involving only determin'Ltion of whether the killing was in the perpetration of a felony, the defendant
had been engaged in attempting to break and enter a freight station when the
killing occurred. This was not burglary at common law, 26 but became so by the
Act of 1860, which made the breaking, etc., of any structure belonging to "any
body corporate" burglary.27 Thus, the act of the defendant was a felony sufficient
to convict defendant of second degree murder, but the court expressed doubt as
to the outcome if a conviction of murder in the first degree had resulted. This
25"Did the legislature in creating a new offense and calling it felonious rape . . . intend to
attach to it a meaning . . . making an unintentional homicide occurring in its commission murder
of the first degree? If so, then the term rape as it occurs in the 91st section of the Act has now
a larger and wider meaning than it had when the act was passed." Note that the court referred to
the meaning of the 91st section, which defines rape, as being controlling.
26One of the elements of burglary at common law was that the breaking and entry be a dwelling house.
IV BI. Com. 224; 3 Co. Inst. 63.
27
Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382, §135.
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case shows that at least in second degree murder in the commission of a felony, a
28
felony created by the statute of 1860, not existing at common law, is sufficient.
In cases not involving this precise question, but involving seemingly identical
principles,, reasoning is given which would support the view that the statutory
definitions should be used. In Commonwealth v. Wells, 110 Pa. 463, the Commonwealth sought to exact a forfeit of the stakes in a bet on the outcome of a
primary election. An old statute made betting on elections subject to such penalty.
But primary elections had been established by a subsequent statute. The court
held that such penalty could not be applied, on the ground that the statute making such bets illegal could not, at the time of its enactment, have referred to
primary elections, and could not be extended to do so by implication. Here tne
question was presented without reference to any common law definitions, but
with the issue clearly stated as to whether an offense defined and punishable by
one statute may be enlarged, and the original penalty attached to such enlargement,
by a subsequent statute. There was no thought of the word "elections" having
any other meaning than that it had at the time of the passage of the penal statute,
and the statutory meaning at that time was taken without question as the test.
And in a Maine case 29 where the grade of a homicide depended upon the
classification of the crime in the perpetration of which the killing was done as a
felony or a misdemeanor, the court said that this rule was "adopted without any
view to perpetuate the ancient classification of offenses," indicating that the definition of the necessary collateral crime was to be that which was in force at the
time of the adoption of the rule or statute based upon such classification, and not
an inflexible common law classification.3 0
A rule of statutory construction which supports the same view is expressed
in these words: "If in a subsequent clause of the same act provisions are introduced which show the sense in which the Legislature employed the doubtfui
phrases previously used, that sense is to be adopted in construing those paragraphs." 81 Some of the felonies, a definition of which we are attempting to
determine, are so defined by "subsequent clauses of the same act," and some are
defined by previous clauses, making the assumption even stronger that the definitions in the same act, the Code of 1860, are to be used. If this be the rule of
law as it is of logic, the adoption of the statutory definitions will result from its
application to the present problem.
It would seem, in consideration of the theory which seems to underlie all
the foregoing, that the question is reduced to a choice of one of two definite
28

Accord: S. v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578; P. v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 159.
See supra,
note 16.
29
S.v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578.
SOAccord, holding that a legislative creation of new felonies or abolition of old enlarges or
diminishes the scope of a substantial re-enactment by statute of the common law definition of
murder: P. v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 159.
3125 R. C. L. 1064.
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ideas: adoption of (1) the common law definitions, or of (2) the definitions contailned in the Code. An effort has been made to show that the latter is more sound,
but in either case we know that the courts adhere to the rule that what was not
embraced in the terms arson, rape, robbery and burglary at the time of their use
in the murder statute will not be included in them except by express amendment.
Yet despite this very definite theory, there appear to be cases in which a concept
wholly at variance with it appears.
This concept finds expression in the case of Commonwealth v. Levine, 82
Pa. Super. 105. In this case the defendant, who had burned down the house
occupied by himself and was charged with arson, advanced as his defense the
fact that the statute relied on by the prosecution, removing the defense of occupancy to an arson charge, 2 was unconstitutional, because it amended the Code of
1860 defining arson, and was not in conformity with constitutional provisions
regarding amending acts. 8 The court held that the act was constitutional, and
that it did not amend the older statute. Yet it did change tht meaning of terms
in the older statute-the words "of another"-just as completely as the Act of
1887 changed the meaning of the term "rape." It inlarged the scope of the crime
as originally defined. And, in further analogy to our murder problem, the statute
in question required reference to and incorporation in the older statute in order to
make it effective, because the later act neither defined the crime itself nor prescribed a punishment. The court indicated a realization of this by saying in effect
tha: the new statute amended the other by implication, and by admitting that it
enlarged the old established crime of arson by including within its scope a new
class of persons-those who burn the house they occupy. This, as we have seen,
is just what the court in the Exler case refused to do: enlarge the scope of a
criminal statute by allowing a later statute to amend it by implication. On the
one hand we have a court stating categorically that a statute will not operate to
amend an earlier one unless thL amendment be express; and on the other we find
a court enforcing a statute which did operate to extend the terms of a prior statute,
and which, if the amendment had been express, would have been wholly invalid.
The court in the Levine case cited as an illustration the statute which made
dogs personal property and the subject of larceny, which was passed subsequently
to the statute defining larceny, and was not an express amendment thereof. This
statute was held to be constitutional and was 'enforced without any question being
raised as to the effectiveness of its operation upon the pre-existing law of larceny.S4
This is not strictly in point, but the similarity of the principles of statutory con32Act of June 10, 1881, P. L. 117; and see ante, note 13.
33"No law shall be revived, amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by
refereance to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended or extended or conferred
shall be re-enacted and published at length." Const. of Penna., Art. III, §6. The 1881 act made
no specific reference of any sort to the section of the Code of 1860 defining arson.
34C. v. Depuy, 148 Pa. 201.
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struction involved must appear at once and the difference in theory become almost
startling. If this be the case, is it not logical to assert that dogs, made the subject
of larceny in this way, would also be the subject of robbery, by the same reasoning; and that dog-takers thus made subject to the punishment accompanying larceny, by implied reference to pre-existing statutes punishing larceny, would also
in like manner be made subject to the punishment accompanying robbery? The
same reasoning applies to other types of property not subject to larceny at common law but made so by statute, and there are authorities to this effect.35
In summary form, the difference may be expressed thus: in both cases we
have (1) a criminal statute, which is (2) followed by a subsequent enactment
(3) enlarging the scope of one of the terms of the original statute. The question
is, does the subsequent enlargement of the term enlarge its operation as used in
the original statute? If it does, it is in effect an amendment. In the Levine case,
such a subsequent statute was held not to be an express amendment. Since the
operation was to enlarge a term of the original statute ("of another") it operated
as an amendment, which forces us to the conclusion, by simple elimination, that
it was an implied amendment. A result was reached which flatly contradicts the
rule laid down in the other line of cases, viz., that a criminal statute may not be
amended by implication.
Evaluation of the weight of the two conflicting approaches, however, is not
a difficult matter. In the Exler case and those following its rule, the matter is
dealt with unclouded with issues as to mere form, and a result in accord with the
weight of authority generally is reached. In the Levine case, moreover, the Court
recognized the problem in the form of its discussion here only by its dicta as to
the larceny of a dog, and did not deal with the question of amendment by implication except in illustration. Fortunately for present purposes, the question as
to the possibility of robbing a man of his dog or his written evidence of a chose
in action under the present statutory situation is not now under discussion, and
no attempt will be made'to analyze the law on these points.
In passing, however, some consideration should be given to the argument
of expediency advanced by the Superior Court in the Levine opinion. The Court
called attention to the extremely clumsy processes which would be necessary under
the doctrine of the Exier case to make a term occurring in several phases of the
statutory criminal law larger in scope and at the same time prevent it from having
a different meaning in each different connection in which it is used. This result
could only be obviated by combing through the whole mass of the statutory law,
and expressly amending each criminal statute in which the enlarged term appeared,
so as to make the term uniform with the new meaning which it has acquired by
the enlarging statute. Using the court's example of larceny of a dog, the new
3554 C. J. 1012; Clark & Marshall, Criminal Law, 2nd ed., 549, 550; Turner v. S., i Oh.
St. 422.
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definition of dogs as personal property would have necessitated a re-enactment of
all the criminal statutes turning upon the definition of personal property, and
exp:ressly inserting therein a statement that dogs shall be included in the term
-personal property." It is scarcely necessary to add that under the modern liberalized approach to the criminal law, this extreme strictness in construction is
unreasonable, and the likelihood of the Legislature's taking the steps to am'end
such terms uniformly is very small indeed. Under the law as it stands, as stated
in the Exler case and followed in the subsequent Pennsylvania decisions,86 it
appears inevitable that we shall have to work with words and phrases in criminal
statutes which have one meaning here, another there, and a third in some other
connection.
There remains glaringly untouched the word "kidnapping," added to
the list of felonies by the amendment of the murder statute in 1923. That this
crime presents special problems unique to itself will be seen at once in the fact
that kidnapping at common law and by the Code of 1860 was a mere misdemeanor
and became a felony in Pennsylvania only by subsequent statute. 87 The cases on
kidnapping in general in the state are few and apparently of no great significance,
and there are none involving the question of murder in kidnapping. Nothing,
therefore, can be added here to the adecuate and extensive s,,rvev of the problems
in this connection by Dean W. H. Hitchler in Volume 29, Dickinson Law Review,
beginning at page 63.88
THOMAS I. MYERS

UNILATERAL CONTRACT OF FORBEARANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
It is well settled that forbearance to exercise a right may be sufficient consideration for a promise. 1 The Restatement of the Law of Contracts 2 defines
consideration for a promise as being (1) an act other than a promise, or (2) a
forbearance, or (3) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation,
or (4) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
36C. v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309; C. v. Fronheiser, 6 D. & C. 710; C. v. Robb, 284 Pa. 99;
C. v. Foster, 111 Pa. Super. 451; C. v. Sevey, 26 D. & C. 600.

87Act
of Feb. 25, 1875, P. L. 4; Act of April 4, 1901, P. L. 65.
8
3 By way of supplementing Dean Hitchler's discussion of the problem of murder in kidnapping, it would appear that his assumption that the word "kidnapping" must be given its common law meaning might be misleading, in that it would appear that the word might be given a
meaning acquired by statute prior to 1923. If this is the case, kidnapping as used in the Act of
1923 would be a felony, an unintentional killing in the commission of which would be murder.
See ante, notes 16 and 30.
2lWilliston

Sec. 75.

on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Sec. 135, and cases there cited.

